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July 9, 2002
Abstract
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country
unionized, we analyze how wage setting and firm location are influ-
enced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can
induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom
and cannot happen in a corresponding model without unionization.
FDI is undertaken partly to win a distributional battle with union-
ized labor, and the incentives to invest abroad can be too large seen
from a welfare point of view.
1 Introduction
Closer international economic integration is perhaps one of the most im-
portant societal trends in the last half of the twentieth century. Increased
specialization, larger scales of production and harsher competitive pressures
are likely to benefit consumers across the globe. Still, the globalization of
our economies is viewed with scepticism and fear by many. Will trade lib-
eralization mean the end to decent pay and job security? Will the good
∗We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of Bergen, Wissenshaftzen-
trum Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin, Second Nordic Workshop on International Trade in
Bergen, Second Norwegian Workshop on Labor Markets and Education in Rosendal, Third
Nordic Workshop on Industrial Organization in Helsinki and two anonymous referees. We
thank the Norwegian Research Council for financial support (‘Næring, finans og marked’)
through the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration.
†Both: University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway. E-mail:
kjell.lommerud@econ.uib.no and frode.meland@econ.uib.no.
‡Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, N-5045
Bergen, Norway. E-mail: lars.sorgard@nhh.no.
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jobs disappear to non-unionized foreign countries with more lax labor regu-
lations, with ”a great sucking sound”, as Ross Perot so famously put it? Or
will workers in the western world experience that their “wages are set in Bei-
jing”, to quote Freeman (1995)? In short; does globalization give capital the
upper hand, either leading to job losses or to a depression of wages? Borjas
and Ramey (1995) argue that increased trade can reduce the possibility for
blue-collar workers to extract rents from their firm, and that this can help
explaining the rising wage inequality in the United States - and find empir-
ical support for their view. This type of empirical studies is an important
back-drop for the present work.
Of course, if “globalization” is taken to mean that firms and their
workers totally lose any market power they might have had, this is bound
to hurt unionized workers. But globalization can be given less extreme in-
terpretations. Here we study an international oligopoly where international
transport costs are reduced, but the number of active firms remains the same.
This has been a popular model in the theoretical literature that studies how
unionized labor might fare in the face of globalization, as we shortly shall
review. The main novelty here is to allow for capital flight, which we think an
important aspect of reality. We allow for two diﬀerent types of foreign direct
investment (FDI). The less dramatic case is when a firm chooses to serve a
non-unionized foreign market from a plant built in that country rather than
through exports. The more radical option is to move all the activities of
a firm to this non-unionized economy, including production for the former
home market.
It borders on the trivial to note that high union wages creates incen-
tives for capital flight (of either form). It is perhaps a more subtle point that
we show that economic integration — in the sense that the marginal trade
cost is reduced — can strengthen the incentive to capital flight. Common
wisdom, though, is that lower transport costs favor the export solution over
FDI, as exports become cheaper when the trade cost drops. Foreign direct
investments have been gaining in importance in world economic relations in
recent decades. At the same time there has been a strong momentum towards
trade liberalization. This is an apparent puzzle. The usual explanation is
that this is the interplay of opposing forces: Trade liberalization points at
more exports, but ”something else” (as the fixed costs of establishing foreign
plants going down in parallel with the marginal trade cost) leads the firms to
undertake more FDI [see, e.g., Markusen and Venables (1998)]. Our point is
that in an international unionized oligopoly model it can be explained how
trade liberalization can cause FDI.1
1The only empirical study which, to our knowledge, tests on a disaggregate level the
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In general terms, our results also support the notion that the problem
with unions and economic integration is “sucking sound” job losses rather
than Beijing wages. If all union sector jobs disappear due to a full move of
the firm abroad, it is hard to know if one should refer to this as a loss of jobs
or a drop in wages. However, when FDI signifies that the foreign country
is served by a new-built plant abroad, wages for the remaining unionized
workers are shown actually to go up: The cost saving potential from the
firm’s side is that they are fewer.
We also want to highlight the result that trade liberalization can lead to
a drop in national welfare. Unionized workers lose, and the possible gains for
other groups are not always large enough to outweigh this. One key reason
for this is that the combination of strong unions and trade liberalization can
lead the firm to invest real resources in FDI just to win a distributional battle
with the union. It also enters the picture that trade liberalization can lead
to profit shifting from owners of firms in a unionized economy to owners of
firms in non-unionized economies.
A growing body of research studies theoretical models of international
unionized oligopoly.2 In turn, a subset of these papers study the impact
of reduced trade barriers in an international unionized oligopoly framework.
The papers that perhaps are closest to our own work are Naylor (1998, 1999).
Naylor uses a linear demand international unionized oligopoly model, just as
we do. Monopoly unions set wages, but employment determination is left to
the discretion of the fim, again just as in our model. A key point in Nay-
lor’s analysis is that in many popular models of wage determination, wage
claims are governed by the elasticity of labor demand rather than firms’
profitability. When trade costs are lowered, there will be harsher competi-
tion among the participants in an international oligopoly, but the output of
relationship between trade costs on the one hand and exports/FDI on the other, does not
support the standard theoretical prediction. Feinberg, Keane and Bognanno (1998) test
how MNCs and their aﬃliates responded to US-Canada tariﬀ reductions. They find that
tariﬀ reductions led to more foreign direct investment rather than more exports. See also
Hanson (1998), which surveys the existing literature on the eﬀect of NAFTA on industry
location. The broad picture suggests that trade liberalization triggers relocation of firms.
2A seminal paper is Brander and Spencer (1988). Their main focus is on how unions
influence optimal strategic trade policy. Also Dowrick (1989) includes a trade union model
where oligopoly rents are the source of union power. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991)
and Bughin and Vannini (1995) investigate the interrelationship between unionism and a
firm’s choice between serving a foreign market through exports or by investing abroad. In
a diﬀerent set-up, Zhao (1995) studies unionized international oligopoly and cross-hauling
foreign direct investment. Straume (2001) studies the scope for collusion among firms and
unions in an international oligopoly situation. However, none of these studies addresses
how closer economic integration aﬀects outcomes in unionized oligopolies.
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the firms will go up, which in his framework (for a situation with two-way
trade between the countries initially) implies that labor demand becomes less
elastic. So while firms suﬀer a profit loss, unions will choose to set higher
wages.3 Because of the output expansion, employment nevertheless goes up,
so unionized labor wins on both counts. This is undeniable a more rosy ac-
count of the impact of trade liberalization on the situation of unionized labor
than the popular notions that for example are expressed in the above Ross
Perot quote. This paper has extended Naylor’s reasoning by allowing for for-
eign direct investment. Precisely because of the tendency to wage increases
after trade liberalization that Naylor points out, trade liberalization gives
firm an increased incentive to capital flight, which is not the case in a corre-
sponding model without unions. Another diﬀerence between our framework
and that of Naylor is that whereas he studies trade liberalization between
two unionized countries, we study a situation with one unionized and one
non-unionized country. Intuitively, FDI triggered by union-set wages should
be more relevant when union strength diﬀers considerably between the two
economies.4
In our model as in Naylor’s work, economic integration is pictured as a
marginal decrease of the trade cost that is incurred when goods are delivered
from one country to the other. Driﬃl and van der Ploeg (1993, 1995) study
economic integration in a similar way, but apply a model of monopolistic,
rather than oligopolistic competition.5 Alternatively, Sørensen (1993, 1994)
and Huizinga (1994) compare autarky with full integration.6 It can be ar-
gued that Naylor’s modelling approach encompasses that of Sørensen and
Huizinga, which is why we have chosen to work with a model quite close to
3This inverse relationship between trade costs and wages is also found in Driﬃl and van
der Ploeg (1995). It is consistent with some empirical findings from US manufacturing
industries [see Gaston and Trefler (1994) and Lovely and Richardson (1998)].
4Of course, both our assumption of non-unionized labor in the foreign country and
Naylor’s assumption of equally powerful unions should be seen as benchmark cases. Even
among countries that are rather similar, as the European ones, labor market institutions
and wage structures are quite diﬀerent. Durand, Madaschi and Terribile (1998) find signif-
icant cross-country diﬀerences in manufacturing wages between European countries, even
if cross-country diﬀerences in productivity are taken into account.
5The main focus in these latter articles is on the eﬀects of national versus international
unionism.
6It is noteworthy that these latter models yield predictions that sometimes are in
apparent contradiction to those that come out of Naylor’s analysis. For example, they
predict that trade liberalization leads the union wage to fall, whereas Naylor predicts
that it will rise. The contradiction is only apparent, though, because also Naylor’s model
predicts that the wage under autarky is higher than the one under full integration. But
given that trade costs are suﬃciently low as to induce two-way trade, a still lower trade
cost will increase the wage.
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Naylor’s framework.7 Note that also this body of literature works with the
assumption that FDI is not possible.8
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model outline.
The model can be described as a three-stage game. In section 3, we analyze
the third stage of the game in which firms in an international oligopoly choose
outputs. Given the nature of the previous stages of the game, we have
to consider three possible trade/location regimes at this stage. In section
4, we analyze the second stage of the game in which monopoly unions set
wages. Again, outcomes are regime-contingent. In section 5, we analyze the
firm’s subgame perfect location choice. We show how these choices vary with
trade costs. We also consider the non-union benchmark case as a comparison
with our main results. Section 6 discusses welfare implications and section 7
concludes.
2 The model
We consider two countries, denoted H (home) and F (foreign), and two
producers, denoted A and B. Initially, producer A is located in the home
country and producer B resides in the foreign country.9 There is a monopoly
trade union in countryH, whereas labor is assumed non-unionized in country
F . Output is produced in a constant returns to scale process, with labor as
the only input. Let x and y denote A’s sales and u and v denote B’s sales in
the home and foreign countries, respectively. We assume inverse demand in
the two countries to be symmetric and given by:
p = a− b(x+ u) (1)
q = a− b(v + y) (2)
a, b > 0. p is the price in the home country, while q is the price in the foreign
country.
The diﬀerence in unionization across the two countries is assumed to
imply higher costs of production in the home country relative to the foreign
7Andersen and Sørensen (1993) and Danthine and Hunt (1994) model trade liberaliza-
tion as an increase in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
8Naylor and Sanoni (1998), however, explicitly consider foreign direct investment in a
framework corresponding to that used in Naylor (1998, 1999). This time the possibility of
serving a foreign market through exports is ruled out by assumption, so again the choice
between exports and foreign direct investment is not studied.
9We could have extended the model by, say, introducing n > 1 foreign firms. That
would change our quantitative results, such as the cutoﬀ points between the regimes.
However, it can be shown that our main findings would not change.
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one. More specifically, we model a situation where the competitive wage in
the two countries are equal (w ≥ 0) and the union in the home market sees
this wage level as their reservation wage, setting wages to maximize a simple
Stone-Geary type utility function:10
U = (w − w)z (3)
z is A’s production in the home market and equals x + y in the case of
no FDI.11 w < a is assumed.
Given our assumptions, B is located in a low cost country, and we assume
that this producer continues to produce only in that country. We look at a
situation where FDI is potentially undertaken by firm A, and focus on two
diﬀerent ways for that firm to invest abroad. A can sink some fixed cost
J > 0 to establish a new production facility in the foreign country, able to
supply that market. We will call this strategy regime II, or ‘partial FDI’.
Regime I is the base case of no investment. However, by sinking another fixed
cost G, A can instead move the entire home production unit to the foreign
country, enabling A to produce for both countries in the low-cost country.
This strategy is referred to as regime III or ‘full FDI’. The relative cost of
these two investment strategies will be discussed later.
We assume competition between the two producers to be Cournot and
adopt the segmented market hypothesis. Thus both firms choose separate
quantities for the two markets. Furthermore, there is a per unit cost of trade,
denoted t ≥ 0, which is incurred by both producers if they attempt to export
to the other country. Trade liberalization in our model is seen as a marginal
reduction in this cost.
We model the game structure as follows: First, the home firm chooses
whether to invest in the foreign market by either of the two ways described
above, or not to invest at all. The most irreversible decision is arguably
the one made by producer A concerning his location choice. In line with
this reasoning, it is natural to let this decision be taken first. Next, we
assume unions to set wages, whereupon the producers simultaneously choose
quantities.12
10In this model, depending on trade costs and wages, either none, only one or both
firms will export. Given that the wages are endogenously determined, it is not clear how
the union and the firm should reach an agreement on whether to export, deter imports
or adapt to imports. In a right-to-manage set-up this choice would have to be bargained
over in parallel with wage determination. Using the monopoly union set-up allows both
these decisions to be taken by the union, evading the problem. This consideration applies
equally to the models of Naylor (1998, 1999).
11We have chosen this form for union utility to enable direct comparison of profits and
union utility. Union utility and profits are here measured in terms of the same unit.
12This sequence of moves is the same as in Naylor and Santoni (1998), Bughin and
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We solve, of course, by backward induction, and the following sections
discuss the three diﬀerent stages starting with the production decision at
stage three.
3 Stage 3. Production
We distinguish among three basic scenarios at the production stage: Either
firm A has not invested (regime I), or it has invested in either of the two
possible ways (regime II or III). In addition, the wage levels have already
been determined. We also study a non-union benchmark where the wages in
the two countries are assumed constant and equal.
3.1 Regime I. No FDI
Here, firm A has not invested. Thus a simple two-plant, two country Cournot
duopoly prevails where the two producers choose quantities as follows:
x, y = argmax
x,y
[(a− b(x+ u)− w)x+ (a− b(v + y)− w − t)y] (4)
u, v = argmax
u,v
[(a− b(v + y)− w)v + (a− b(x+ u)− t− w)u] (5)
This is of course subject to the constraint that all production quantities
should be non-negative.
It is easily demonstrated that the equilibrium sales are:
x, u =

1
3
a−2w+t+w
b
, 1
3
a+w−2t−2w
b
if w − 2t ≥ 2w − a
a−w
2b
, 0 if w − 2t < 2w − a
(6)
v, y =

a−w
2b
, 0 if w + t ≥ a+w
2
1
3
a+w+t−2w
b
, 1
3
a+w−2w−2t
b
if w + t < a+w
2
(7)
A lower wage set by the union leads to higher output of the unionized firm
in its home market and lower sales in this market by the foreign competitor
(if the latter produces for market H). If the wage is suﬃciently low relative
to the trade costs, the foreign competitor will not want to sell in market
Vannini (1995), Zhao (1995) and Collie and Vandenbussche (1998). On the other hand,
if the trade union could credibly commit to a wage, results would change as unions could
deter investment through their choice of wage level.
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H. This happens for w − 2t < 2w − a. However, if the wage and the trade
costs are below some threshold (w + t < a+w
2
), the unionized firm will be
able to export into the neighboring market. In this case, the low cost foreign
producer will also export to country H.13 Finally, there is the possibility that
none of these inequalities hold, and in this case there is one way trade into
the home market.
3.2 Regime II. Partial FDI
In this case, firm A has two plants, one in each country. Firm A0s plant in
the foreign country has by assumption lower costs than the one situated in
the home country and will be used to supply the foreign country.
Given this assumption, the two producers choose quantities as follows:
x, y = argmax
x,y
[(a− b(x+ u)− w)x+ (a− b(v + y)− w)y] (8)
u, v = argmax
u,v
[(a− b(v + y)− w)v + (a− b(x+ u)− t− w)u] (9)
The Nash equilibrium entails the same level of sales in market H as in
regime I. This is secured by the segmented market hypothesis and the fact
that production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, leaving the
production decisions for the two markets independent. However, production
for the foreign market changes:
v = y =
1
3
a− w
b
(10)
This is simply the usual single market, linear demand Nash equilibrium
where both firms have costs w.
In the foreign market the link between union wage and market shares is
now broken. In regime II, unionized labor no longer takes the eﬀect of their
wage decision on exports into account.
3.3 Regime III. Full FDI
Finally, if firm A chooses to move the entire home plant abroad, incurring
a cost of G, production for the two markets are symmetric and for the case
of the foreign country, equal to the production derived for regime II. For
the home market, however, the situation has changed and the two producers
13The two sets w − 2t < 2w − a and w + t < a+w2 are mutually exclusive for w ≥ 0.
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now compete on equal basis, both incurring a trade cost when producing for
market H :
x = u =
½
1
3
a−w−t
b
if t ≤ a− w
0 if t > a− w
Of course, in regime III unionized labor no longer has a role to play, so
all production levels are independent of union wages.
3.4 Non-union benchmark
In this case, we assume both producers to have marginal costs equal to w.
It is easily verified that the following equilibrium production patterns then
emerge (for regime III they are the same as for the unionized case, so this is
excluded):
xI , yI = vI , uI =
½
a−w+t
3b
, a−w−2t
3b
if t < a−w
2
a−w
2b
, 0 if t ≥ a−w
2
(11)
yII = vII =
a− w
3b
, xI = xII , uI = uII (12)
The expressions found in this section constitute the equilibrium produc-
tion patterns given wages and type of foreign direct investment. We now
turn to union wage setting, which will also be contingent upon the chosen
type of FDI.
4 Stage 2. Wage setting
In regime III, the unionized firm has moved all production facilities abroad,
and the union no longer has a role to play. However, in regime I and II, the
union faces diﬀerent employment possibilities, which will induce it to follow
diﬀerent wage policies in the two regimes. We start out by investigating
regime I, where there is no FDI. This means that we will be close to the
model in Naylor (1999). The diﬀerences between our wage schedule and the
one found by Naylor, stems from the fact that here only one economy is
unionized, not both. The regime I wage schedule and the consequent union
utility levels can be derived straightforwardly from the expressions found in
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the previous section:
wI =

1
4
a− 1
8
t+ 3
4
w if t ≤ (3√2− 4) (a− w)
1
4
a+ 1
4
t+ 3
4
w if (3
√
2− 4) (a− w) < t < 5
7
(a− w)
2t+ 2w − a if 5
7
(a− w) ≤ t ≤ 3
4
(a− w)
1
2
(a+ w) if t > 3
4
(a− w)
(13)
U I =

1
48b
(2a− t− 2w)2 if t ≤ (3√2− 4) (a− w)
1
24b
(a+ t− w)2 if (3√2− 4) (a− w) < t < 5
7
(a− w)
1
b
(a− t− w)(2t+ w − a) if 5
7
(a− w) ≤ t ≤ 3
4
(a− w)
1
8b
(a− w)2 if t > 3
4
(a− w)
(14)
In figure 1, we have plotted the wage level (top) and utility (bottom)
against the trade cost (deflated by (a− w) ; dotted lines represent the regime
II case discussed later):
Figure 1. Union wage level and utility under regimes I and II
The wage function in regime I (and union utility) is piecewise linear with
four segments, due to the following argument:
1. For high trade costs (more precisely for t ≥ 3
4
(a − w)), the proper
autarky wage - that is, the wage that would be set if there was an
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exogenous ban on trade - is low enough to stop trade from occurring.
This wage is then chosen by the union in this segment. In the language
of industrial organization, imports are blockaded.
2. If the union continues to choose the autarky wage for t < 3
4
(a − w),
the foreign competitor will choose to sell in country H. In the above
specified interval, the union will opt to lower the wage in order to stop
this from happening, capitalizing on the employment gain from such a
strategy. We are then still in autarky since no exports or imports take
place, but the possibility of trade influences outcomes. Imports are no
longer blockaded, but deterred.
3. The above strategy implies a sinking wage as trade costs fall. At some
point, the employment gain of such a strategy no longer justifies the
low wage. For t < 5
7
(a − w), the union will instead adapt to imports,
setting a wage higher than the import deterring wage. A still lower
trade costs means a higher level of imports, and consequently, lower
domestic employment. More importantly for wages, however, is the
fact that the domestic labor demand elasticity to wages increases with
lower trade costs. As a response, the union lowers their wage claims
(and union utility falls) as in the previous segment, but the wages are
nevertheless higher than in the case of import deterrence.
4. As trade costs fall, the union - if adapting to imports - chooses to de-
crease wages. However, eventually, another strategy will prove to be
better: By setting a low enough wage, the union may be able to induce
the home firm to export. This strategy will entail a low wage, but high
employment as domestic production rises. The optimal wage schedule
under exports is rising with lower trade costs, while as we have seen, it
is falling if the union adapts to imports. At t = (3
√
2− 4) (a− w) , the
two strategies provide the union with the exact same utility, and conse-
quently, for lower trade costs, the union chooses to induce exports. This
implies a discontinuous fall in wages at t = (3
√
2−4) (a− w) .What re-
mains is then to explain why wages and utility is now rising with lower
trade costs. When these costs fall, the domestic firm gets easier access
to the foreign market. This, in turn, leads to increased domestic em-
ployment demand. At the same time, the competitor becomes a more
fierce rival at home, leading to the opposite eﬀect. However, the net
eﬀect is increased - and more importantly, more elastic - employment
demand. The union responds by setting higher wages and obtaining
higher utility.14 Qualitatively, this is the same eﬀect as is central in
14For a further discussion about this wage eﬀect, see our supplementary notes in Lom-
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Naylor’s work (Naylor (1998, 1999)).15,16
We now turn to regime II (partial FDI). In essence, from the viewpoint
of the union, regime II is simply regime I without the export option.17 The
wage schedule is now piecewise linear with three segments. The low-wage
strategy to induce exports no longer makes sense. In reference to figure 1,
the utility and wage level continue to drop as trade costs fall below t =
(3
√
2 − 4) (a− w). This means that the high-wage strategy wage line with
one-way trade is prolonged into the range with the lowest values of t (dotted
lines).
Even though the wage now drops with lower trade costs, the wage is
higher than it would be if no investment was undertaken. When it already
has been decided to serve the foreign market through FDI, the desire to
induce exports no longer brings about wage moderation. The domestic wage
level increases, but employment falls and so thus union utility. However, the
domestic firm’s total wage bill may nonetheless decline: The higher domestic
wage is accompanied by production for the foreign market being undertaken
abroad, and wages there are by assumption lower.
5 Stage 1. Location choice
In this section, we start out directing attention to the non-union case to
establish a benchmark. We then go on to discuss the eﬀects determining the
location choice when the home labor market is unionized. To keep things
instructive and short, we dispense with all mathematical expressions. For
the interested reader, there is a supplement available.18
merud et. al. (2002). There, we also show that this kind of eﬀect from trade liberalization
would apply to a much larger set of demand systems than the family of linear systems
discussed here.
15Quantitatively, however, the wage increase following a trade cost reduction is smaller
here than in Naylor’s model. The Naylor model features an additional union in the foreign
country. The two unions act as Bertrand competitors in a wage game to attract employ-
ment. Their wage levels are strategic complements. If both unions respond to the above
incentive to increase wages, this in turn gives both unions a strategic complementarity
”push” to increase wages further.
16In Naylor’s framework, the segment of the wage schedule with one-way trade and a
wage that falls with lower trade costs, is not present. As indicated earlier, this comes
from our assumption of unionization in one country only, which naturally brings about
one-way trade. Also, due to only modelling one union, we find a pure strategy equilibrium
for intermediate trade costs, contrary to Naylor (1999).
17The expressions for the wage and union utility in regime II can be found in Lommerud
et. al. (2002).
18Lommerud et. al. (2002).
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5.1 Non-union benchmark
Profits for this case can easily be derived from the equilibrium production
quantities of section 3. The following figure plots these profits as a function
of the trade cost. Fixed costs are excluded.
Figure 2. Profits in the non-unionized case
Both for regime I and II, there will be no trade for t ≥ 1
2
(a− w). In this
case, the monopoly single market production quantities bring prices below
the trade costs, and consequently trade is blockaded. This does not apply in
regime III, as in this case, there is no producer located in country H. Here
there will be trade as long as the marginal willingness to pay exceeds the
trade costs (t < (a− w)).
In regime I, a reduction in trade cost beyond t = 1
2
(a−w) has an ambigu-
ous eﬀect on producer A’s profit. Lower trade cost results in more intense
rivalry between firms. On the one hand, producer A is hurt by facing a more
competitive rival - a rival with a lower trade cost - in its home market. On
the other hand, producer A gains by becoming a more competitive rival in its
neighboring market. In addition, producer A saves trade cost on its existing
quantity of trade. The larger the amount of trade initially, the more goods
are actually physically transported between the countries, and the larger the
direct cost saving. This explains why a reduction in trade cost has a negative
impact on profits for high values of t - where trade is limited - and a positive
impact on profits for low values of t.
In regimes II and III, the relationship between trade costs and profits is
more straightforward. Under partial FDI (regime II), producer A does not
participate in international trade. The only eﬀect of lower trade costs (below
t = 1
2
(a − w)) is a more competitive rival in country H, which hurts the
profit of producer A. In regime III, both producers face lower trade costs to
country H. As a result, both gain from a lower trade cost.
The figure also nicely illustrates the following:
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Proposition 1 :
1. In the non-unionized case, full FDI (regime III) is never beneficial.
2. For high trade costs (no trade in regime I), firm A will undertake partial
FDI (regime II) if the cost of this investment is less than the profit
capture made possible by this investment in the foreign market.
3. For low t (trade in regime I), a trade cost reduction will make it less
profitable/ more unprofitable to undertake partial FDI.
Proof. The supplement contains the necessary proofs.
If firmA chooses no investment, the trade costs oﬀer a shelter from intense
foreign competition for the producers in their respective home markets. If
full FDI is chosen, the producers are co-located in the same country. This
leads to tougher competition. This is never profitable, which is summarized
in the first part of the above proposition.
The second part refers to a regime II investment with double autarky
as a starting point. In regime I, initiating exports is unprofitable for high
trade costs, and thus the only way to capture profits from the other market
is to invest and produce there. Of course, the profits earned must then be
compared with the fixed costs of investment.
When we are not in initial autarky, trade prevails in the regime I equi-
librium. However, profit capture from the other market may still be higher
if the firm instead invested in a new plant abroad. A trade cost reduction,
though, decreases the (tariﬀ-jumping) incentive to invest, as the export op-
tion becomes relatively cheaper. We can thus conclude:
Proposition 2 In the non-unionized case, trade liberalization by itself does
not trigger foreign direct investment.
Proof. See the supplement.
5.2 Location choice under unionization
Under unionization, FDI choices are steered not only by trade-cost jump-
ing considerations; international wage diﬀerences also matter. Unionization
raises wages above the competitive level, which generally increases the at-
tractiveness of FDI. This is a level eﬀect. However, as we have seen, wages
are dependent upon the trade costs and the investment strategy chosen. This
will in turn influence how trade liberalization aﬀects FDI decisions.
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We start this section by explaining how a trade cost reduction aﬀects
profits under the three diﬀerent investment scenarios spelled out above. We
then go on to discuss firm A’s incentives to switch to a regime II situation
(partial FDI) and to a regime III situation (full FDI). Finally, we bring the
discussions of the two types of FDI together, focusing on which of the diﬀerent
investment strategies that are optimal - no FDI, partial FDI and full FDI -
given assumptions about the fixed investment costs J and G.
5.2.1 Profits
The profits of producer A in the diﬀerent regimes are illustrated in the fol-
lowing figure as a function of trade costs (investment costs again excluded):
Figure 3. Profits for the unionized case
Profits for the regime III case, ΠIII , are as for the non-union case since,
in both cases, all production is undertaken utilizing foreign labor. To explain
the two other profit curves, we start out with the regime I case and from high
values of t, looking at how trade liberalization changes profits:
For high levels of trade costs, imports are blockaded. No trade takes place
and the possibility of trade does not influence outcomes. Profits are at the
one-market monopolist level (with unionized labor). The next segment still
describes an autarky situation, but here the union’s wage is set, as it were, to
deter imports from the foreign country. The lower the trade cost, the lower
the wage, and the higher the profits. The third segment of the profit curve
applies for one-way trade; from the low-cost foreign producer into firm A’s
home market. The lower the trade cost, the more competitive becomes the
foreign firm. It is true that the union lowers the wage in response, but as we
see, this does not rescue profits from falling with trade liberalization in this
segment. The fourth and last segment describes two-way trade between the
countries, which occurs for low trade costs. Profits rise discontinuously as the
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union decreases wages to induce exports.19 A further trade cost reduction
leads the domestic firm to gain easier access to the foreign market, while the
foreign firm gains easier access to the domestic market. The net eﬀect is
as for the non-union case: For high trade costs (within the two-way trade
interval) a trade cost reduction reduces profits, while the inverse is true for
low trade costs. However, due to the increasing wages, a trade cost reduction
is profitable in a smaller interval than for the non-union case.
There are two diﬀerences between profit curves ΠI (no FDI) and ΠII (par-
tial FDI): For intermediate and large trade costs, the regime I domestic firm
does not supply the foreign market. In contrast, in regime II, the firm serves
the foreign market utilizing the plant abroad. With segmented markets and
constant marginal production costs, the existence of this new plant does not
aﬀect the competitor’s decisions concerning supply to the domestic market
(see section 3.2). Accordingly, firm A’s profits in regime I and II diﬀer only
by the equilibrium profits gained from access to the foreign market, and a
trade cost reduction aﬀects profits in the regime II case as in regime I.
This changes for low trade costs where a regime I firm would choose to
export. Under partial FDI, exports are not an option, and a trade cost
reduction continues to decrease profits (despite the union decreasing their
wage claims).
Let us now consider the incentives for the regime I producer to undertake
FDI. In the following figure we report the profitability of each of the two
forms of FDI relative to no investment, given that G = J = 0:
Figure 4. FDI-incentives
Now, the costs of a regime II and a regime III investment may be very
diﬀerent. We therefore divide the following discussion into three parts: First
19Naylor’s paradoxical result was that wages rise with lower trade costs from this point
on. As we have seen, however, wages are generally lower in this segment than they would
have been if the union did not have the opportunity to induce exports.
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we assume that the costs of a regime III investment are prohibitive, so that
the relevant deliberation is between no investment and partial FDI. Then we
discuss the opposite situation, where full FDI is the only viable investment
strategy. Finally, we turn to the relative profitability of the three investment
scenarios, determining a possible synthesis of the previous discussion.
5.2.2 Partial FDI
For high values of t, we have already discussed that a decision to undertake
partial FDI is determined by a comparison of the value of accessing the foreign
market as a duopolist and the fixed investment costs. This result is basically
the same as for the non-union case (Proposition 1, second part). Arguably,
the more interesting case is when t ≤ (3√2−4) (a− w) . Trade liberalization
has been an on-going process for decades, so it seems intuitive that trade
costs in many markets may now have reached the point where two-way trade
takes place. For these low values of t, we see from figure 4 that the incentive
to undertake partial FDI is weaker, in general, than for higher trade costs.
This tallies well with the standard insight that it becomes less attractive to
serve a foreign market through FDI when exports are a viable alternative.
The surprising bit comes when we study how the incentives for partial
FDI change with a reduction in t, given two-way trade. For some of these
values of t, the incentives for a regime II investment are strengthened by
reduced trade costs, contrary to common wisdom. The reason for this lies in
the wage formation process. With no FDI, we have already explained that
wages rise with lower t in this area. With partial FDI, wages are higher, but
falling with lower trade costs (cfr. fig. 1). A motivation for partial FDI is to
gain access to cheap foreign labor. On the cost side, the remaining domestic
workers will increase their wage in response to this. But the size of the wage
jump for domestic labor is smaller the lower the trade costs. This lies behind
the counter-intuitive result that a trade cost reduction can strengthen the
FDI alternative over the export alternative. We state this discussion as a
proposition:
Proposition 3 In a two-way trade situation, lower trade costs can strengthen
the incentive to serve a foreign market by FDI rather than by exports. This
is in contrast to the non-unionized case.
Proof. The proof is left to the interested reader.
However, the ‘standard’ eﬀect that lower trade costs make exports cheaper
is also present, and for very low values of t - when the volume of export (if
chosen) would be very high - it dominates: Lower trade costs then weakens
partial FDI incentives.
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5.2.3 Full FDI
From figure 4, it is also apparent that if the regime III investment cost,
G, is suﬃciently low, it will always be profitable for the firm to move all
its production abroad. In contrast, in the non-unionized case moving all
production abroad was never profitable (Proposition 2, first part):
Proposition 4 In contrast to the non-unionized case, full FDI is always
profitable provided the investment costs are suﬃciently small.
Proof. The proof is left to the interested reader.
There will always be a cost disadvantage in being located in a unionized
home country, so moving abroad would save costs. Further, this cost advan-
tage of FDI, plus the advantage of cheaper access to the foreign market, will
always outweigh the disadvantage of more costly access to the previous home
market - for low enough values of the fixed cost G.
Turning to the impact of a trade cost reduction, we have already seen
that this may increase the incentives to undertake a regime II investment.
From figure 4, the eﬀect is even more apparent for the regime III investment
scenario. Full FDI avoids high production costs (wages) on the entire pro-
duction quantity of firm A, but comes at the expense of incurring trade costs
when supplying market H. A trade cost reduction makes this last negative
eﬀect lower, and thus contributes to higher investment incentives as trade
costs fall. However, there are two exceptions to this conclusion. First, for
high trade costs, the union may choose to lower wages to deter imports in
regime I, as discussed in section 4 (part 2). This accounts for the upward
sloping segment of ∆ΠIII−I in figure 4. Second, the union may in regime I
choose to lower their wages to induce exports, which accounts for the discon-
tinuous shift in ∆ΠIII−I in figure 4. A trade cost reduction may therefore
reduce the incentives to invest if we ‘move across’ one of these intervals for
the trade cost, but the opposite may also very well happen. Referring to
Proposition 3, this proposition still holds for the case of full FDI.
Also, it is worth noting that for low trade costs, the regime I option
involves higher wages as trade costs fall (section 4, part 4). This means that
the ‘full FDI’ incentive curve, ∆ΠIII−I , is particularly steep in that segment
since a trade cost reduction both increases the equilibrium profits in regime
III and helps evade the higher wages in regime I.
5.2.4 A possible synthesis
Next, let us consider what type of FDI the domestic firm will choose, given
that one of the forms of investment is taken for granted. Assuming G = J,
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we can plot the diﬀerence in profits for the two strategies:
Figure 5. Relative profits from the two types of investment
The actual investment strategy will of course depend upon the costs of
the two FDI-choices, but the above figure nicely illustrates that the regime
III option may generally be the more profitable one for low trade costs, while
the regime II investment strategy is better for high trade costs. This is so if
J = G. These costs might be very diﬀerent, though. The cost of establishing
a foreign plant might for example be only a fraction of the cost of moving the
whole firm abroad. Then partial FDI would be chosen also for low levels of
t. However, as discussed for the case of full FDI above, the ”wage-jumping”
eﬀects become increasingly important as trade costs fall. It is easily shown
that G has to exceed J by no less than three fourths’ of the duopoly profits
in country F to make building a new plant a better alternative than moving
all production abroad no matter the level of trade costs.
6 Welfare analysis
In this section, we explore the welfare aspects of the optimal investment
decision discussed in the previous section. To do this, welfare under the
three investment schemes needs to be compared. We utilize a measure of
national welfare, calculated as the sum of consumer surplus in country H,
union utility and profits for firm A. We assume that the costs of investment
are real resource costs, and they influence national welfare through their
deduction in firm A0s net profits.
Union utility and firm profits have already been discussed in some depth.
In the supplement, we provide a discussion of consumer surplus in our model
as well as the expressions for national welfare. Here, we turn directly to na-
tional welfare, which is illustrated in figure 6 for the three regimes (assuming
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again that G = J = 0):
Figure 6. National welfare in the three regimes
We see that within a given regime, trade liberalization can reduce national
welfare. To illustrate this, let us consider the case with one-way trade - that
is the third segment from the left of the national welfare curves of regimes
I and II: Here, a lower trade cost is good for consumers, as the foreign firm
becomes a more potent competitor in the market under study. Domestic
firms and workers suﬀer, however. In sum the eﬀect on welfare is indeed
negative. A basic reason is that the increased profits earned by the foreign
firm as trade is liberalized, does not count in national welfare.
As can be observed from the figure, national welfare in regime II is always
higher than for regime I (remember that investment costs are set to zero).
For the case of high trade costs, this is entirely due to the profits accrued by
investing abroad, as union utility and consumer surplus are not aﬀected by
this move. However, for low trade costs (t < (3
√
2−4) (a− w)), the diﬀerence
is lower due to unions lowering their wage demands to induce exports in
regime I, which in turn gives lower domestic prices, higher union utility and
higher profits. National welfare is only higher in regime III for low trade costs.
In this case, the higher profits and the possibly increased consumer surplus
(see supplement) from investing abroad more than compensate for the drop
in union utility that follows a complete move of all production abroad.
We now turn to study whether or not the domestic firm has correct in-
vestment incentives from a welfare point of view. The domestic firm will have
two possible motives for investing abroad: To capture market shares, or to
win a distributional battle with the home union. The union’s role is the novel
feature of our model. Moreover, the outcome of the distributional battle may
have a negative impact on national welfare. Due to these considerations, we
want to focus on the distributional issue. For partial FDI, the incentives to
invest are governed solely by the net profits from capturing market shares
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when trade costs are high. To abstract from the issue concerning the battle
for market shares, we focus on the complementary case of low trade costs.
Attention is restricted to the case of low trade costs also when discussing full
FDI. This is done both to keep the analysis compact, and because we feel
that this constitutes a reasonable assumption.
Focusing, then, on the two-way trade situation, we can show that there
might be over-investment in equilibrium:
Proposition 5 For low trade costs (two way trade in regime I), a regime
I producer has, from a national welfare point of view, too large investment
incentives.
Proof. The proof is provided in the supplement.
This holds for both the ‘partial FDI’ case and the ‘full FDI’ case.
If the firm chooses full FDI, union utility will of course fall. Consumer
surplus will generally rise when trade costs are low because competition be-
comes harsher than before.20 However, it can be shown that the fall in union
utility is larger than the possible gain in consumer surplus. Consequently,
national welfare increases by less than profits. Thus there exists some range
of investment costs under which the firm would undertake the investment
while national welfare drops as a result.21
The incentives to undertake partial FDI are also too large seen from a
welfare point of view. While moving - if it is undertaken - would increase
profits, both union utility and consumer surplus invariably drops. Union
utility decreases because the domestic firm no longer exports to the foreign
market. Consumer surplus drops because the investment induces unionized
labor to increase its wage claims, which leads to decreased domestic sales.
7 Concluding remarks
What shall we make of all this? This is not the place to repeat all our findings.
We narrow our focus to the question of whether or not trade liberalization
between a unionized and a non-unionized country seriously weakens the po-
sition of unionized labor. Naylor’s result, in a somewhat diﬀerent model
format, that trade liberalization increases the union-set wage and utility can
be seen as an optimistic ”no” response to this question. In broad terms, we
20This does not apply for t very close to (3
√
2 − 4) (a−w) in the case of a shift from
regime I to regime III; see figure 1 in the supplement.
21In the supplement we show that the same is true if firm A is initially a regime II
producer and trade costs are above some very limited level.
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have reached a much less rosy conclusion: Precisely because trade liberaliza-
tion has this tendency to increase union wages, the firm’s incentive to move
out production to a non-unionized economy is strengthened. Moreover, the
incentive for a full move of all production rather than a limited move only of
production destined for the foreign market, is also strengthened. Unionized
labor can lose from trade liberalization, but the problem might very well be
one of job losses, rather than wage cuts. From a welfare viewpoint, trade
liberalization can be detrimental to welfare. One important reason is that
fixed investment costs are undertaken mainly to win a distributional bat-
tle between firm owners and unionized labor, but it also enters the picture
that trade liberalization can shift profits from domestic capitalists to foreign
owners of non-unionized firms.
Speculatively, one could argue that after decades of economic integration,
even further trade liberalization should probably start form quite low levels of
trade costs. Moreover, we know that foreign direct investments become more
and more important relative to trade. These are precisely the circumstances
where further trade liberalization hurts the interests of unionized workers.
One should of course be careful about drawing strong policy conclusions
from a highly stylized model. But in broad terms our analysis suggest that
strong unions and trade liberalization do not sit well together. The right wing
version of this is to say that weaker unions would be good, since production
would then not be forced out of the country at the expense of national welfare.
A left wing alternative is that trade liberalization is the problem, since it
undermines the eﬀorts of ordinary workers to obtain a living wage.
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